How Does Calvinism Help Protect Liberty?

 Abraham Kuyper’s third lecture, Calvinism and Politics is about Calvinism as the source and the only way to maintain and protect liberty both from the threats of State tyranny and the popular concept of liberty. In this lecture, Kuyper touching politics, he wants to dispel the idea that confines Calvinism as purely an ecclesiastical and doctrinal movement. Consistent to the concept that politics is basically grounded on a certain religious or anti-religious idea, Calvinism shares similar character in providing political changes that affected “three historic lands of political freedom, the Netherlands, England and America” (p. 78).

Kuyper quoting Bankroft, affirms that “a Calvinist is a fanatic for liberty, for in the moral warfare for freedom, his creed was a part of his army, and his most faithful ally in the battle’” (ibid.). Referencing Groenvan Prinsterer, he repeats: “‘In Calvinism lies the origin and guarantee of our constitutional liberties’” (ibid.). Such influence exerted by Calvinism is acknowledged by “every competent historian” and “all scientific students” (ibid.).

Calvinism’s fundamental idea that serves as the source of such political influence is the concept of cosmological “Sovereignty of the Triune God over the whole Cosmos, in all  its spheres and kingdoms, visible and invisible” (p. 79). This central concept serves as the basis of “a threefold deduced supremacy,  viz., 1. The Sovereignty in the State; 2. The Sovereignty in  Society; and 3. The Sovereignty in the Church” (ibid.).

Following the threefold deduced sovereignty mentioned above, Kuyper divided his third lecture into three parts plus an application of the theory.

The Sovereignty in the State

At the outset, Kuyper contrasted the organic character of the human race from the mechanical character of the State. By organic, he meant, “Together we form  one humanity, not only with those who are living now, but also with all the generations behind us and with all those who shall come after us. . . All the human race is from  one blood” (ibid.). To maintain this organic unity politically in the post-sin world is now impossible. Emperors failed to this seriously and that’s why their dream of world empire did not work. In our time, similar dream is shared both by social democracy and anarchy, but for Kuyper, such political project is “a looking back after a lost paradise” (p. 80) and therefore unattainable.

By mechanical character of the State, Kuyper meant that it is “something unnatural; something against which the deeper aspirations of our nature rebel; and which, on this very account, may become the source both of a dreadful abuse of power, on the part of those who exercise it, and of a continuous revolt on the part of the multitude” (ibid.). From this tension, “the battle of the ages between Authority and Liberty” started, “and in this battle it was the very innate thirst for liberty which proved itself the God-ordained means to bridle the authority” (ibid.) whenever it degenerated into tyranny. And so to understand the true character “of the State with and of the assumption of authority by the magistrate, and on the other hand all true conception of the right and duty of the people to defend liberty,” one cannot get away from the basic idea in Calvinism “that God has instituted the magistrates, by reason of sin” (pp. 80-81).

From the foregoing concept that God instituted sovereignty in the State by reason of sin, Kuyper clarifies that in this basic idea “both the  light-side  and the shady-side of the life of the State” are hidden (p. 81). By “shady-side,” Kuyper referred to the mechanical character of the rule by State officers, which runs contrary to nature and that such exercise of power is in the hands of “sinful men, and is therefore subject to all manner of despotic ambitions” (ibid.). On the other hand, by “light-side,” Kuyper meant that “for a sinful humanity, without division of states, without law and government, and without ruling authority, would be a veritable hell on earth; or at least a repetition of that which existed on earth when God drowned the first degenerate race in the deluge” (ibid.). And so from a realization of the possible excesses of State power in both sides, Calvinism also provides us two political insights to respond to such potential threats: “first—that we have gratefully to receive, from the hand of God, the institution of the State with its magistrates, as a means of preservation, now indeed indispensable. And on the other hand also that, by virtue of our natural impulse, we must ever watch against the danger which lurks, for our personal liberty, in the power of the State” (ibid.).

In addition to two basic ideas of Calvinism as a political faith that God alone is sovereign over all nations and that God instituted the State as a mechanical remedy due to sin’s destruction of the organic unity of mankind, Calvinism maintains that the nature of authority that officers of the State possess cannot be derived from them, but from the hand of God. Kuyper elaborates:

“In Politics also it taught us that the human element—here the people—may not be considered as the principal thing, so that God is only dragged in to help this people in the hour of its need; but on the contrary that God, in His Majesty, must flame before the eyes of every nation, and that all nations together are to be reckoned before Him as a drop in a bucket and as the small dust of the balances” (ibid.).

Explaining the disintegration of humanity because of sin, Kuyper emphasizes the nature of State power:

“When therefore humanity falls apart through sin, . . . when sin, in the bosom of these nations, separates men and tears them apart, and when sin reveals itself in all manner of shame and unrighteousness—the glory of God demands that these horrors be bridled, that order return to this chaos, and that a compulsory force, from without, assert itself to make human society a possibility” (pp. 81-82).

“This right is possessed by God, and by Him alone” (p. 82).

“No man has the right to rule over another man, otherwise such a right necessarily, and immediately becomes the  right of the strongest” (ibid.).

“Authority over men cannot arise from men. Just as little from a majority over against a minority, for history shows, almost on every page, that very often the minority was right. And thus to the first Calvinistic thesis that  sin alone has necessitated the institution of governments,  this second and no less momentous thesis is added that:  all authority of governments on earth originates from the Sovereignty of God alone” (ibid.). 

After emphasizing the nature of State power, Kuyper mentions the form of government that Calvin prefers, which in the mind of the former is relevant to the present discussion. For Calvin according to Kuyper, the nature of the authority of the State is not “affected by the question how a government is instituted and in what form it reveals itself” (p. 83) whether it’s a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy though Calvin personally favored a republican system where Kuyper further describes such preference as “a cooperation of many persons under mutual control” (ibid.).

Closely related to these diverse forms of government is the process how such power from God is bestowed upon the officers of the State through the instrumentality of men. Here also various ways exist but the most desirable condition is when “the people itself chooses its own magistrates” (ibid.), which Calvin describes as “popular choice” (p. 84). Kuyper explains this process further: “I may add that the popular choice gains the day, as a matter of course, where no other rule exists, or where the existing rule falls away. Wherever new States have been founded, except by conquest or force, the first government has always been founded by popular choice; and so also where the highest authority had fallen into disorder, either by want of a determination of the right of succession, or through the violence of revolution, it has always been the people who, through their representatives, claimed the right to restore it” (ibid.).

And then Kuyper identifies other ways authority is bestowed such as “from the right of inheritance, as in a hereditary monarchy,” “from a hard-fought war,” “from electors, as it did in the old German empire,” or “it may rest with the States of the country, as was the case in the old Dutch republic” (ibid). We see all of these various forms “because there is an endless difference in the development of nations” (ibid.).

Recapitulating all the mentioned insights taken from this concept of the Sovereignty of God over all nations, Calvinism is properly called “a political faith” (p. 85). Again, these threefold insights include the following: “1. God only—and never any creature—is possessed of sovereign rights, in the destiny of the nations, because God alone created them, maintains them by His Almighty power, and rules them by His ordinances. 2. Sin has, in the realm of politics, broken down the direct government of God, and therefore the exercise of authority, for the purpose of government, has subsequently been invested in men, as a mechanical remedy. And 3. In whatever form this authority may reveal itself, man never possesses power over his fellowman in any other way than by an authority which descends upon him from the majesty of God” (ibid.).

In contrast to this Calvinistic concept of politics, two dominant political theories exist: Popular-sovereignty and State-sovereignty. The model of Popular-sovereignty is the anti-theistic stance declared in Paris in 1789 and the model of State-sovereignty was the political theory “developed by the historico-pantheistic school of Germany” (ibid.). For Kuyper, though there are differences between these two, but at heart they are identical.

And then Kuyper explains in detail the character of Popular sovereignty. Though in part the spirits of the men behind the French revolution were animated by hatred at abuses of  “crowned despotism” and by “a noble defense of the rights and liberties of the people,” but the impelling force was its opposition to the sovereignty of God. And that is why to say that French revolution is similar to “the great revolutions in the Calvinistic world” is a misreading of the character and distinction between these two kinds of revolution. A certain Edmund Burke confirms this when he said that “the ‘glorious Revolution’ of 1688” is the exact opposite in terms of principle from that “of the Revolution of 1789” (ibid.). Compared to “the three great revolutions in the Calvinistic world,” which “left untouched the glory of God” and “even proceeded from the acknowledgment of His majesty,” the French revolution was hostile against these basic truths. Kuyper gave us a lengthy elaboration of the difference between these two kinds of revolution:

“Every one will admit this of our rebellion against Spain, under William the Silent. Nor has it even been doubted of the ‘glorious Revolution,’ which was crowned by the arrival of William III of Orange and the overthrow of the Stuarts. But it is equally true of your own Revolution. It is expressed in so many words in the  Declaration of Independence, by John Hancock, that the Americans asserted themselves by virtue—‘of the law of nature and of nature's God’; that they acted—‘as endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable rights’; that they appealed to—‘the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of their intention’; and that they sent forth their ‘declaration of Independence’—‘With a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence.’ In the ‘Articles of Confederation’ it is confessed in the preamble,—‘that it hath pleased the great Governor of the world to incline the hearts of the legislators.’ It is also declared in the preamble of the Constitution of many of the States: ‘Grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political and religious liberty, which He has so long permitted us to enjoy and looking unto Him, for a blessing upon our endeavors.’ God is there honored as ‘the Sovereign Ruler,’ and the ‘Legislator of the Universe’ and it is there specifically admitted, that from God alone the people received ‘the right to choose their own form of government.’ In one of the meetings of the Convention, Franklin proposed, in a moment of supreme anxiety, that they should ask wisdom from God in prayer. And if any one should still doubt whether or not the American revolution was homogeneous with that of Paris, this doubt is fully set at rest by the bitter fight in 1793 between Jefferson and Hamilton. Therefore it remains as the German historian Von Holtz stated it: ‘Mere madness would it be to say that the American revolution borrowed its impelling energy from Rousseau and his writings.’ Or as Hamilton himself expressed it, that he considered ‘the French Revolution to be no more akin to the American Revolution than the faithless wife in a French novel is like the Puritan matron in New England.’" (pp. 86-87).

Kuyper adds:

“The French Revolution is in principle distinct from all these national revolutions, which were undertaken with praying lips and with trust in the help of God. The French Revolution ignores God. It opposes God. It refuses to recognize a deeper ground of political life than that which is found in nature, that is, in this instance, in man himself. Here the first article of the confession of the most absolute infidelity is—‘ni Dieu ni maitre.’ The sovereign God is dethroned and man with his free will is placed on the vacant seat. It is the will of man which determines all things. All power, all authority proceeds from man. Thus one comes from the individual man to the many men; and in those many men conceived as the people, there is thus hidden the deepest fountain of all sovereignty. There is no question, as in your Constitution, of a sovereignty derived from God, which He, under certain conditions, implants in the people. Here an original sovereignty asserts itself, which everywhere and in all states can only proceed from the people itself, having no deeper root than in the human will. It is a sovereignty of the people therefore, which is perfectly identical with atheism. . . . In the sphere of Calvinism, as also in your Declaration, the knee is bowed to God, while over against man the head is proudly lifted up. But here, from the standpoint of the sovereignty of the people, the fist is defiantly clenched against God, while man grovels before his fellowmen, tinseling over this self-abasement by the ludicrous fiction that, thousands of years ago, men, of whom no one has any remembrance, concluded a political contract, or, as they called it, ‘Contrat Social.’" (pp. 87-88).

As for the outcome, there is also a great difference between these two kinds of revolution. History testifies that “the rebellion of the Netherlands, the ‘glorious Revolution’ of England and the American revolution “against the British Crown have brought liberty to honor” whereas “the French Revolution resulted in anything else but the shackling of liberty in the irons of State-omnipotence” (p. 88). The lamentable condition of France in the 19th century proved this. And that is why “Germany has broken away from this fictitious sovereignty of the people, since the days of De Savigny and Niebuhr” (ibid.). “The Historical school, founded by these eminent men,” has denounced “the aprioristic fiction of 1789. Every historical connoisseur now ridicules it.” (ibid.).

Let us now turn our consideration to the character of State sovereignty. Kuyper describes this political theory as follows:

“. . . the Sovereignty of the State, a product of Germanic philosophical pantheism. Ideas are incarnated in the reality, and among these the idea of the State was the highest, the richest, the most perfect idea of the relation between man and man. Thus the State became a mystical conception. The State was considered as a mysterious being, with a hidden ego; with a State-consciousness, slowly developing; and with an increasing potent State-will, which by a slow process endeavored to blindly reach the highest State-aim. The people was not understood as with Rousseau, to be the sum total of the individuals. It was correctly seen that a people is no aggregate, but an organic whole. This organism must of necessity have its organic members. Slowly these organs arrived at their historic development. By these organs the will of the State operates, and everything must bow before this will. This sovereign State-will might reveal itself in a republic, in a monarchy, in a Caesar, in an Asiatic despot, in a tyrant as Philip of Spain, or in a dictator like Napoleon. All these were but forms, in which the one State-idea incorporated itself; the stages of development in a never-ending process. But in whatever form this mystical being of the State revealed itself, the idea remained supreme; the State shortly asserted its sovereignty and for every member of the State it remained the touchstone of wisdom to give way to this State-apotheosis” (pp. 88-89).

As a result of this high view of the State, the transcendent character of God falls away and has been transferred to the State. We now have a view of State as a “god”. In this divinization of the State, the most important instrument is the law. It is considered binding in it itself “not because its contents are in harmony with eternal principles” (p. 89). And so if the majority of people would agree on making something a law though it contradicts the will of God, such law is considered right and binding. And here’s how Kuyper summarizes this divinization of the State and its will: “That which exists is good, because it exists; and it is no longer the will of God, of Him Who created us and knows us, but it becomes the ever-changing will of the State, which, having no one above itself, actually becomes God, and has to decide how our life and our existence shall be” (ibid.).

And so in contrast to these two dominant political theories, “the atheistic popular-sovereignty of the Encyclopedians, and the pantheistic state-sovereignty of German philosophers,” Calvinism “maintains the Sovereignty of God, as the source of all authority among men” (p. 90). Kuyper strongly believes that only within this political theory that we can find a way to escape the excesses of both the popular will and State will through humanistic laws: 

It makes it easy for us to obey authority, because, in all authority, it causes us to honor the demand of divine sovereignty. It lifts us from an obedience born of dread of the strong arm, into an obedience for conscience sake. It teaches us to look upward from the existing law to the source of the eternal Right in God, and it creates in us the indomitable courage incessantly to protest against the unrighteousness of the law in the name of this highest Right. And however powerfully the State may assert itself and oppress the free individual development, above that powerful State there is always glittering, before our soul's eye, as infinitely more powerful, the majesty of the King of kings. . .” (ibid.).

The Sovereignty in Society

By sovereignty in society, Calvinists understand this “that family, business, science, art and so forth are all social spheres, which do not owe their existence to the state, and which do not derive the law of their life from the superiority of the state, but obey a high authority within their own bosom; an authority which rules, by the grace of God, just as the sovereignty of the State does” (ibid.).

Based on this analysis, an antithesis exists between State and Society, for one is mechanical in character and the other one is organic. The State cannot intrude and has nothing to command in these social spheres. Kuyper explains further the distinction between the mechanical character of the State and the organic character of social spheres:

“It is here of the highest importance sharply to keep in mind the difference in grade between the  organic life of society and the  mechanical character of the government. Whatever among men originates directly from creation is possessed of all the data for its development, in human nature as such. You see this at once in the family and in the connection of blood relations and other ties. From the duality of man and woman marriage arises. From the original existence of one man and one woman monogamy comes forth. The children exist by reason of the innate power of reproduction. Naturally the children are connected as brothers and sisters. And when by and by these children, in their turn, marry again, as a matter of course, all those connections originate from blood-relationship and other ties, which dominate the whole family-life.  In all this there is nothing mechanical. The development is spontaneous, just as that of the stem and the branches of a plant” (p. 91).

“Accordingly all Science is only the application to the cosmos of the powers of investigation and thought, created within us; and Art is nothing but the natural productivity of the potencies of our imagination. . . . All together they form the life of creation, in accord with the ordinances of creation, and therefore are  organically developed” (p. 92).

“But the case is wholly different with the assertion of the powers of government. . . .Thus peoples and nations originated. These peoples formed States. And over these States God appointed governments. And thus, if I may be allowed the expression, it is not a natural head, which organically grew from the body of the people, but a  mechanical head, which from without has been placed upon the trunk of the nation” (pp. 92-93).

With this mechanical personality of the State, “the principal characteristic of government is the right of life and death” (p. 93) and the sword is the best symbol to represent such power. Based on apostolic testimony, this sword has a threefold meaning: “It is the sword of justice, to mete out corporeal punishment to the criminal. It is the sword of war to defend the honor and the rights and the interests of the State against its enemies. And it is the sword of order, to thwart at home all forcible rebellion” (ibid.). However, Kuyper emphasizes that to serve justice remains the highest duty of the government, and secondly the protection of its citizenry both from domestic and foreign threats (ibid.). The outcome of this organic character of social spheres and the mechanical nature of the government is one of conflict and tension simply because the latter tends “to invade social life, to subject it and mechanically to arrange it. But on the other hand social life always endeavors to shake off the authority of the government, just as this endeavor at the present time again culminates in social-democracy and in anarchism, both of which aim at nothing less than the total overthrow of the institution of authority” (pp. 93-94). But despite such detrimental outcome due to mechanical interference of government, still Kuyper thinks that cooperation is attained between society and the State with “the so-called ‘constitutional government’” (p. 94), and it is exactly in this area that Calvinism made a great contribution. Kuyper explains further the nature of this contribution:

“And in this struggle Calvinism was the first to take its stand. For just in proportion as it honored the authority of the magistrate, instituted by God, did it lift up that second sovereignty, which had been implanted by God in the social spheres, in accordance with the ordinances of creation” (ibid.).

“It demanded for both independence in their own sphere and regulation of the relation between both, not by the executive, but  under the law. And by this stern demand, Calvinism may be said to have generated constitutional public law, from its own fundamental idea” (ibid.).

And then Kuyper claims that history testifies that such constitutional public law has not flourished both in Roman Catholic and Lutheran countries, but only in Calvinistic countries (ibid.). And the reason for such historical phenomenon is due to the fundamental concept of Calvinism concerning God’s sovereignty, which descended upon men both in organic and mechanical spheres. “On the one hand the mechanical sphere of  State-authority, and on the other hand the organic sphere of the authority of the  Social circles. And in both these spheres the inherent authority is sovereign, that is to say, it has above itself nothing but God” (ibid.).

After emphasizing the manner this tension between the organic and mechanical spheres is resolved through constitutional government, Kuyper then gave us specific examples of such organic authority in different social spheres where he cites Science as his first example. In this sphere, Kuyper describes genius as “a sovereign power” (p. 95). He identifies “men like Aristotle and Plato, Lombard and Thomas, Luther and Calvin, Kant and Darwin” (p. 94) whose influence extend beyond their time. Focusing on the historical influence of both Lombard and Thomas, Kuyper quoted a learned Thomist: "‘The work of Lombard has ruled one hundred and fifty years’ and after him the “Summa” of Thomas has ruled all Europe during five full centuries and has generated all the subsequent theologians’"(pp. 94-95). For Kuyper, the sovereignty of genius is evident in the formation of schools and in its irresistible influence on the spirits of men and “on the whole condition of human life” (p. 95). He further describes this sovereignty as “a gift of God, possessed only by His grace. It is subject to no one and is responsible to Him alone Who has granted it this ascendancy” (ibid.).

The same thing is true in the sphere of Art where the maestro plays the kingly rule “not by the law of inheritance or by appointment, but only by the grace of God. And these maestros also impose authority, and are subject to no one, but rule over all and in the end receive from all the homage due to their artistic superiority” (ibid.).

A third example is “the sovereign power of personality” (ibid.). Here we see that equality does not exist among men and women. There are weak and narrow-minded people, and there are also strong and broad-minded people. Among the strong, “you will find a few of royal grandeur, and these rule in their own sphere” (ibid.). And differences in personality can be seen “in all the spheres of life. In the labor of the mechanic, in the shop, or on the exchange, in commerce, on the sea, in the field of benevolence and philanthropy. Everywhere one man is more powerful than the other, by his personality, by his talent and by circumstances. Dominion is exercised everywhere; but it is a dominion which works organically; not by virtue of a State-investiture, but from life's sovereignty itself” (ibid,).

As to the sovereignty of the sphere, Kuyper expounds:

“The University exercises scientific dominion; the Academy of fine arts is possessed of art-power; the guild exercised a technical dominion; the trades-union rules over labor—and each of these spheres or corporations is conscious of the power of exclusive independent judgment and authoritative action, within its proper sphere of operation. Behind these organic spheres, with intellectual, aesthetical and technical sovereignty, the sphere of the family opens itself, with its right of marriage, domestic peace, education and possession; and in this sphere also the natural head is conscious of exercising an inherent authority,—not because the government allows it, but because God has imposed it. Paternal authority roots itself in the very life-blood and is proclaimed in the fifth Commandment. And so also finally it may be remarked that the social life of cities and villages forms a sphere of existence, which arises from the very necessities of life, and which therefore must be autonomous” (p. 96).

Summarizing this idea of sphere sovereignty, Kuyper classifies them at least under four categories:

 “1. In the social sphere, by personal superiority. 2. In the corporative sphere of universities, guilds, associations, etc. 3. In the domestic sphere of the family and of married life, and 4. In communal autonomy” (ibid.).

Kuyper warns that “in all these four spheres the State-government cannot impose its laws, but must reverence the innate law of life” (ibid.) for God Himself rules in these spheres.

Kuyper clarifies further this idea of limited sovereignty of the State:

“Bound by its own mandate, therefore, the government may neither ignore nor modify nor disrupt the divine mandate, under which these social spheres stand. The sovereignty, by the grace of God, of the government is here set aside and limited, for God's sake, by another sovereignty, which is equally divine in origin. Neither the life of science nor of art, nor of agriculture, nor of industry, nor of commerce, nor of navigation, nor of the family, nor of human relationship may be coerced to suit itself to the grace of the government. The State may never become an octopus, which stifles the whole of life. It must occupy its own place, on its own root, among all the other trees of the forest, and thus it has to honor and maintain every form of life which grows independently in its own sacred autonomy” (pp. 96-97).

After clarifying the sovereignty of social spheres and the limitation of State power, Kuyper identified the government’s threefold right and duty in relation to social spheres: “1. Whenever different spheres clash, to compel mutual regard for the boundary-lines of each; 2. To defend individuals and the weak ones, in those spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest; and 3. To coerce all together to bear personal and financial burdens for the maintenance of the natural unity of the State. The decision cannot, however, in these cases, unilaterally rest with the magistrate. The Law here has to indicate the rights of each, and the rights of the citizens over their own purses must remain the invincible bulwark against the abuse of power on the part of the government” (p. 97).

Considering both the limited power of the State and its legitimate duty in relation to social spheres, the idea of cooperation between these two entities as noted earlier is best expressed in the Constitution. During Calvin’s time, it assumed diverse forms arising from “the doctrine of the ‘magistratus inferioris’” (ibid.) such as the “knighthood, the rights of the city, the rights of guilds and much more, led then to the self-assertion of social ‘States,’ with their own civil authority. . .” (ibid.). Since then, these “social orders are now no longer invested with ruling power, their place is taken by Parliament, or whatever name the general house of representatives may bear in different countries, and now it remains the duty of those Assemblies to maintain the popular rights and liberties, of all and in the name of all, with and if need be  against the government” (ibid.). Regardless of the form, the important thing to bear in mind is that in Calvinism, people can find an assurance, “in all its classes and orders, in all its circles and spheres, in all its corporations and independent institutions, a legal and orderly influence in the making of the law and the course of government, in a healthy democratic sense” (pp. 97-98). The testimony of history is clear that “Calvinism protests against State-omnipotence; against the horrible conception that no right exists above and beyond existing laws; and against the pride of absolutism, which recognizes no constitutional rights, except as the result of princely favor” (p. 98). These three which Kuyper perceives as coming from “absolutistic stream” are serious threats and would even result to death to civil liberties. And it was Calvinism who “built a dam across this absolutistic stream, not by appealing to popular force, nor to the hallucination of human greatness, but by deducing those rights and liberties of social life from the same source from which the high authority of the government flows—even the  absolute sovereignty of God. From this one source, in God, sovereignty in the individual sphere,  in the family and in every social circle, is just as directly derived as the  supremacy of State authority” (ibid.).

The Sovereignty in the Church

For Kuyper, how to understand sovereignty in the church is a more difficult problem than the second part of his lecture on Calvinism and politics. He describes the nature of this difficulty as follows: 

“The difficulty of the problem lies elsewhere. It lies in the pile and fagots of Servetus. It lies in the attitude of the Presbyterians toward the Independents. It lies in the restrictions of liberty of worship and in the ‘civil disabilities,’ under which for centuries even in the Netherlands the Roman Catholics have suffered. The difficulty lies in the fact that an article of our old Calvinistic Confession of Faith entrusts to the government the task ‘of defending against and of extirpating every form of idolatry and false religion and to protect the sacred service of the Church.’ The difficulty lies in the unanimous and uniform advice of Calvin and his epigonies, who demanded intervention of the government in the matter of religion” (p. 99).

Given this historical fact, we cannot take the side of Calvinism, but oppose it in the name of religious liberty. However, a cautious consideration must be made, which Kuyper calls a “rule” to judge a system: “a system is not known in what it has in common with other preceding systems; but that it is distinguished by that in which it differs from those preceding systems” (p. 100). Understanding this rule in relation to Calvin’s position advocating government intervention in matters of religion will help us in our judicial evaluation of Calvinism from historical point of view. Kuyper gave us an elaborate explanation:

“The duty of the government to extirpate every form of false religion and idolatry was not a find of Calvinism, but dates from Constantine the Great, and was the reaction against the horrible persecutions which his pagan predecessors on the imperial throne had inflicted upon the sect of the Nazarene. Since that day this system had been defended by all Romish theologians and applied by all Christian princes. In the time of Luther and Calvin, it was a universal conviction that that system was the true one” (ibid.).

“But whilst the Calvinists, in the age of Reformation, yielded their victims, by tens of thousands, to the scaffold and the stake (those of the Lutherans and Roman Catholics being hardly worth counting), history has been guilty of the great and far-reaching unfairness of ever casting in their teeth this one execution of fire of Servetus, as a crimen nefandum” (ibid.).

“Notwithstanding all this, I not only deplore that one stake, but I unconditionally disapprove of it; yet not as if it were the expression of a special characteristic of Calvinism, but on the contrary as the fatal after-effect of a system, grey with age, which Calvinism found in existence, under which it had grown up, and from which it had not yet been able entirely to liberate itself” (ibid.).

“If I desire to know what in this respect must follow from the specific principles of Calvinism, then the question must be put quite differently. Then we must see and acknowledge that this system of bringing differences in religious matters under the criminal jurisdiction of the government resulted directly from the conviction that the Church of Christ on earth could express itself only in one form and as one institution. This one Church alone, in the Middle Ages, was the Church of Christ, and everything, which differed from her, was looked upon as inimical to this one true Church. The government, therefore, was not called upon to judge, or to weigh or to decide for itself. There  was only one Church of Christ on earth, and it was the task of the Magistrate to protect that Church from schisms, heresies and sects” (pp. 100-101).

The execution of Servetus must be understood that during the time of Calvin the idea that it was the duty of the government to destroy false religion and idolatry was considered a “universal conviction” where Calvin was not able yet to liberate himself. And add to this another universal conviction that the Church of Christ could only express itself under one institution and its was the duty of the government to protect her.

And so instead of judging Calvinism on the basis of this one misunderstood mistake, its better to evaluate Calvinism in terms of its influence that broke the conception of one institutional church that later resulted into the existence of multiple institutions, which are just diverse forms of the one Church of Christ. If we will give this credit to Calvinism, “then it follows that we must not seek the true Calvinistic characteristic in what, for a time, it has retained of the old system, but rather in that, which, new and fresh, has sprung up from its own root” (p. 101).

Comparing the influence of Calvinism on nations to that of both Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism, Kuyper affirms that it is in Calvinist nations that people can enjoy religious freedom:

“Results have shown that, even after the lapse of three centuries, in all distinctively Roman Catholic countries, even in the South American Republics, the Roman Catholic church is and remains the State Church, precisely as does the Lutheran Church in Lutheran countries. And the free churches have exclusively flourished in those countries which were touched by the breath of Calvinism, i.e., in Switzerland, the Netherlands, England, Scotland, and the United States of North America” (ibid.).

“In Roman Catholic countries, the identification of the invisible and the visible Church, under Papal unity, is still maintained. In Lutheran countries, with the aid of ‘curius regio eius religio,’ the Court-confession has been monstrously imposed on the people as the land-confession; there the Reformed were treated harshly, they were exiled and outraged, as enemies of Christ. In the Calvinistic Netherlands, on the contrary, all those who were persecuted for religion’s sake, found a harbor of refuge. There the Jews were hospitably received; there the Lutherans were in honor; there the Mennonites flourished; and even the Arminians and Roman Catholics were permitted the free exercise of their religion at home and in secluded churches. The Independents, driven from England, have found a resting place in the Calvinistic Netherlands; and from this same country the Mayflower sailed forth to transport the Pilgrim Fathers to their new fatherland” (pp. 101-102).

After giving the above comparison, Kuyper repeats himself, saying that “the underlying characteristic of Calvinism must be sought, not in what it has adopted from the past, but in what it has newly created” (p. 102). And then he adds that from the very beginning, “Calvinistic Theologians and jurists have defended liberty of conscience against the Inquisition. Rome perceived very clearly how liberty of conscience must loosen the foundations of the unity of the visible Church, and therefore she opposed it. But on the other hand it must be admitted that Calvinism, by praising aloud liberty of conscience, has in principle abandoned every absolute characteristic of the visible Church” (ibid.).

In matters of religious freedom, Kuyper summarized the basic distinction between the position of Rome from that of Calvinism: “With Rome the system of persecution issued from the identification of the visible with the invisible Church, and from this dangerous line Calvin departed. But what he still persevered in defending was the identification of his Confession of the Truth with the absolute Truth itself, and it only wanted fuller experience to realize that also this proposition, true as it must ever remain in our personal conviction, may never be imposed by force upon other people” (p. 103).

Practical Application: Duty of State Officials

Ending his lecture on Calvinism and Politics, Kuyper provided us practical guideline how to understand the duty of State officials, and he divided it under three categories: “1. towards  God, 2. towards the Church, and 3, towards individuals” (ibid.).

Concerning the first category, State officials are perceived as servants of God. It is their duty “to recognize God as Supreme Ruler, from Whom they derive their power. They have to serve God, by ruling the people according to His ordinances. They have to restrain blasphemy, where it directly assumes the character of an affront to the Divine Majesty. And God's supremacy is to be recognized by confessing His name in the Constitution as the Source of all political power, by maintaining the Sabbath, by proclaiming days of prayer and thanksgiving, and by invoking His Divine blessing” (ibid.). But for State officials to fulfill this duty, Kuyper emphasized the necessity on their part to investigate the rights of God as revealed in nature and in Scripture:

“Therefore in order that they may govern, according to His holy ordinances, every magistrate is in duty bound to investigate the rights of God, both in the natural life and in His Word. Not to subject himself to the decision of any Church, but in order that he himself may catch the light which he needs for the knowledge of the Divine will. And as regards blasphemy, the  right of the magistrate to restrain it rests in the God-consciousness innate in every man; and the duty to exercise this right flows from the fact that God is the Supreme and Sovereign Ruler over every State and over every Nation. But for this very reason the fact of blasphemy is only then to be deemed established, when the intention is apparent contumaciously to affront this majesty of God as Supreme Ruler of the State. What is then punished is not the religious offence, nor the impious sentiment, but the attack upon the foundation of public law, upon which both the State and its government are resting” (ibid.).

However, application of this duty varies depending on the form of government the specific nation has adopted. Kuyper explains:

“Meanwhile there is in this respect a noteworthy difference between States which are absolutely governed by a monarch, and States which are governed constitutionally; or in a republic, in a still wider range, by an extensive assembly. In the absolute monarch the consciousness and the personal will are one, and thus this one person is called to rule his people after his own personal conception of the ordinances of God. When on the contrary the consciousness and the will of many cooperate, this unity is lost and the subjective conception of the ordinances of God, by these many, can only be indirectly applied. But whether you are dealing with the will of a single individual, or with the will of many men, in a decision arrived at by a vote, the principal thing remains that the government has to judge and to decide independently. Not as an appendix to the Church, nor as its pupil. The sphere of State stands itself under the majesty of the Lord. In that sphere therefore an independent responsibility to God is to be maintained. The sphere of the State is not profane. But both Church and State must, each in their own sphere, obey God and serve His honor. And to that end in either sphere  God's Word must rule, but in the sphere of the State only through the conscience of the persons invested with authority. The first thing of course is, and remains, that all nations shall be governed in a Christian way; that is to say, in accordance with the principle which, for all statecraft, flows from the Christ. But this can never be realized except through the subjective convictions of those in authority, according to their personal views of the demands of that Christian principle as regards the public service” (p. 104).

How about the relationship between the government and the visible Church? The answer to this question depends whether the Church we are referring to is perceived as institutionally one or in diverse forms. And then a follow-up question would be proper. Among numerous churches, is it part of the duty of the government to determine which one among many is true? And then to protect such church from other false churches? “Or is it the duty of the government to suspend its own judgment and to consider the multiform complex of all these denominations as the totality of the manifestation of the Church of Christ on earth?” (p. 105). From a Calvinistic perspective, Kuyper favors the latter but explains that such position is “not from a false idea of neutrality, nor as if Calvinism could ever be indifferent to what is true and what false, but because the government lacks the data of judgment, and because every magisterial judgment here  infringes the sovereignty of the Church” (ibid.). For if the government will follow the first position, then the result would be destructive to religious liberty. Say for instance, “if the government rests with a plurality of persons, the Church which yesterday was counted the false one, is today considered the true one, according to the decision of the vote; and thus all continuity of state-administration and church-position is lost” (ibid.).

The position of Calvinists is clear as to the sovereignty of the Church;

“In Christ, they contended, the Church has her own King. Her position in the State is not assigned her by the permission of the Government, but  jure divino. She has her own organization. She possesses her own office-bearers. And in a similar way she has her own gifts to distinguish truth from the lie. It is therefore her privilege, and not that of the State, to determine her own characteristics as the true Church, and to proclaim her own confession as the confession of the truth” (pp. 105-106).

And “if in this position she is opposed by other Churches, she will fight against these her spiritual battle, with spiritual and social weapons; but she denies and contests the right of everyone whomsoever, and therefore also of the government, to pose as a power above these different institutions and to render a decision between her and her sister-churches. The government bears the sword which wounds; not the sword of the Spirit, which decides in spiritual questions. And for this reason the Calvinists have ever resisted the idea to assign to the government a patria potestas” (p. 106).

And so the only legitimate stance of the government in view of the existence of numerous churches is to respect religious liberty and never to interfere in religious affairs. Kuyper clarifies such stance:

“The government must honor the complex of Christian churches as the multiform manifestation of the Church of Christ on earth. That the magistrate has to respect the liberty,  i.e., the sovereignty, of the Church of Christ in the individual sphere of these churches. That Churches flourish most richly when the government allows them to live from their own strength on the voluntary principle. And that therefore neither the Ccesaropapy of the Czar of Russia; nor the subjection of the State to the Church, taught by Rome; nor the "Cuius regio eius religio" of the Lutheran jurists ; nor the irreligious neutral standpoint of the French revolution ; but that only the system of a free Church, in a free State, may be honored from a Calvinistic standpoint” (ibid.).

The final category is about the government’s duty in relation to the sovereignty of the individual person as expressed in liberty of conscience. Calvinism protects this kind of liberty and teaches that neither the Church not the State has the right to coerce it. God is the only sovereign in human conscience. Kuyper quoted two authors that expressed this kind of individual freedom. One is from Prof. Weitbrecht: "Every man stands a king in his conscience, a sovereign in his own person, exempt from all responsibility" (p. 107). And the other is from a certain Held: "In some respects every man is a sovereign, for everybody must have and has a sphere of life of his own, in which he has no one above him, but God alone” (ibid.).

However, Kuyper qualifies this concept of personal liberty in relation to maturity. For according to him, liberty of conscience “does not immediately assert itself. It does not express itself with emphasis in the child, but only in the mature man; and in the same way it mostly slumbers among undeveloped peoples, and is irresistible only among highly developed nations. A man of ripe and rich development will rather become a voluntary exile, will rather suffer imprisonment, nay, even sacrifice life itself, than tolerate constraint in the forum of his conscience” (ibid.). And then Kuyper cited Inquisition as a gross violation of freedom conscience. In this regard, the government has “a twofold obligation: In the first place, it must cause this liberty of conscience to be respected by the Church; and in the second place, it must give way itself to the sovereign conscience” (p. 108).

Explaining this first obligation, Kuyper states:

“. . . the sovereignty of the Church finds its natural limitation in the sovereignty of the free personality. Sovereign within her own domain, she has no power over those who live outside of that sphere. And wherever, in violation of this principle, transgression of power may occur, the government has to respect the claims on protection of every citizen. The Church may not be forced to tolerate as a member one whom she feels obliged to expel from her circle; but on the other hand no citizen of the State must be compelled to remain in a church which his conscience forces him to leave” (ibid.).

Concerning the second obligation, Kuyper clarifies:

“Meantime what the government in this respect demands of the churches, it must practice itself, by allowing to each and every citizen liberty of conscience, as the primordial and inalienable right of all men” (ibid.).

“In order that it may be able to rule men, the government must respect this deepest ethical power of our human existence. A nation, consisting of citizens whose consciences are bruised, is itself broken in its national strength” (ibid.).

Concluding this section on the sovereignty of the individual as expressed in freedom of conscience, Kuyper returned to his early insightful distinction between the freedom based on Calvinism and the kind of freedom boasted by the men behind the French Revolution:

“For it is true that, in Roman lands, spiritual and political despotism have been finally vanquished by the French Revolution, and that in so far we have gratefully to acknowledge that this revolution also began by promoting the cause of liberty. But whosoever learns from history that the guillotine, all over France, for years and years could not rest from the execution of those who were of a different mind; whosoever remembers how cruelly and wantonly the Roman Catholic clergy were murdered, because they refused to violate their conscience by an unholy oath; or whosoever, like myself, by a sad experience, knows the spiritual tyranny which liberalism and conservatism on the European Continent have applied, and are still applying, to those who have chosen different paths,—is forced to admit that liberty in Calvinism and liberty in the French Revolution are two quite different things” (p. 109).

“In the French Revolution a civil liberty for every Christian  to agree with the unbelieving majority; in Calvinism, a liberty of conscience, which enables every man to serve God according to his own conviction and the dictates of his own heart” (ibid.).

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Reference: Kuyper, Abraham. 1931. Lectures on Calvinism: Chapter 3: Calvinism and Politics. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, pp. 78- 109. 

Guide Questions:

1.      Reading Kuyper’s lecture on Calvinism and Politics, what do you think is his main argument?

2.      In contrast to two dominant political stance in the West such as social democracy and the new conservative, how do you see the possibility of a political stance labeled as Calvinist or Reformed libertarian? And what do you think should be the basic political platform of a Reformed libertarian?

3.      What is the most fundamental concept of Calvinism that distinguished it from all other political theories? What are the three kinds of sovereignty deduced from this fundamental concept?

4.      Briefly explain the difference between the organic character of the human race and the mechanical character of the State.

5.      What is the dream of both social democracy and anarchy? Why is such dream impossible?

6.      Why did God instituted the mechanical character of civil government?

7.      Briefly describe the “light-side” and the “shady-side” of the life of the State. In view of these two excesses of State power, how should we respond?

8.      Why is the idea that all authority of governments originates from God very important? What will be the consequences once this idea is denied?

9.      Since governments’ authority is derived from God, what are the diverse ways God bestowed such power upon the officers of the State through the instrumentality of men?

10.  How should we understand Calvinism as a political faith?

11.  What are the two dominant political theories that contradict the Calvinistic concept of politics? Briefly describe each of them.

12.  Briefly describe sphere sovereignty.

13.  Similar to the distinction between the human race and the State, briefly describe also the difference between the mechanical character of the State and the organic character of social spheres.

14.  What is the symbol of the State power? What is the meaning of this symbol. What is the primary duty of the government? What is its secondary duty? Do governments today perform this duty?

15.  What is the major contribution of Calvinism in order to resolve the tension between State and Society? Briefly describe this contribution.

16.  Why do you think that constitutional public law has not flourished both in Roman Catholic and Lutheran countries? And why it has flourished in Calvinistic countries?

17.  Who is considered sovereign in the sphere of science and art? Why?

18.  Briefly define the sovereign power of personality. Considering the sovereign power of personality, is the egalitarian dream realistic?

19.  Identify the four categories of social spheres.

20.  What is the government’s threefold right and duty in relation to social spheres?

21.  Why is understanding sovereignty in the church more difficult than the concept of sovereignty in society?

22.  How should we assess Calvinism when it comes to its historical stance concerning religious freedom?

23.  What is the duty of the government towards God, towards the Church, and towards individuals?

24.  Describe the difference between the kind of freedom based on Calvinism and the kind of freedom boasted by the men behind the French Revolution.